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Abstract 
This article chronicles the difficulties that methodologists of economics have had in introducing 
Karl Popper’s philosophy to their fellow economists. It presents some general reasons for the 
problem before specifically examining the proposition that a sound appreciation of Popper’s 
doctrines cannot be attained from simply studying the doctrines themselves. What it also 
requires is an understanding of the problem situation that the doctrines sought to address. This is 
illustrated through an examination of the way methodologists have grasped, or failed to grasp, 
the development of Popper’s own thought about the problem of demarcating empirical science 
from non-science, and the related problem of whether the limits of empirical science coincide 
with the limits of arguability. The article demonstrates that a neglect of these considerations has 
produced confusion in the literature—both in the way that Popper’s philosophy has been 
presented and in the way in which its contemporary relevance has been assessed. 
Keywords: Popper, Critical Rationalism, Falsificationism.  
JEL Classification: B41 
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1. Introduction 
What problem do Karl Popper’s writings present to methodologists of economics? That there is a 
problem of one sort or another is signified by the great accumulation of literature that addresses the 
issue; a corpus that now includes its own intellectual chronicle-cum-obituary (Backhouse, 2012). 
Indeed, it is perhaps fair to say that something went awry in the introduction of Popper’s philosophy 
to economics. In considering the cause of such difficulties, the usual suspect is the very nature of 
philosophy; it has, after all, long had the reputation of being an abstruse subject—even amongst 
philosophers. But Popper was a philosopher who often argued that clarity of expression was an 
intellectual’s first duty and he castigated and ridiculed those who played ‘…the dreadful game of 
making the simple appear complex and the trivial seem difficult’ (1994A, p. 94). So if we dismiss the 
possibility that those who wrestle with the methodology of economics are themselves secondary 
players of ‘the dreadful game’, then their difficulties in understanding Popper’s philosophy must 
have arisen for reasons other than obscurity by expression.  That is to say, the problem must be 
attributable to either his style of philosophising and general approach to philosophical matters, or it 
must be due to the content of the philosophy itself. The objective of this paper is to examine the 
first of these possibilities. 
This choice of emphasis is not to assert that the content of Popper’s philosophy is unimportant to 
understanding the difficulties that it has presented to methodologists of economics. In particular, 
Popper’s (1957) doctrine of the ‘unity of method’ (UoM)—that all of the theoretical or generalizing 
sciences make use of the same method and that the historical sciences, in a fashion, use it too—
undeniably plays a central role in many of the Popper-related debates that have arisen in the 
methodology of economics; for example, between Hands (1985) and Blaug (1985) and between 
Neves (2004) and Kerstenetzky (2009). The UoM doctrine is also pertinent to some of the other 
significant papers that have assessed Popper’s philosophical and methodological contribution to the 
social and economic explanatory endeavour such as that of Lawson (2008) and Hudik (2011). But I 
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hope to consider the UoM doctrine in a separate paper that is designed to complement this one; 
here I wish firstly to establish that our understanding of the content of Popper’s philosophy can 
benefit from being built upon a firmer footing.  In particular, I want to argue that in order to 
appreciate properly the significance and relevance of a philosopher’s works, one must firstly 
appreciate both his general mode of philosophising and the particular questions and problems 
toward which he directed his thought. This is to say that matters of context ought to be considered 
before matters of more detailed doctrinal content. This approach to studying the history of ideas has 
a precedent: it is associated with the philosopher and historian R.G. Collingwood who called it the 
method of ‘question and answer’ (1939, p. 29). As we shall see, it is an approach to understanding 
the theoretical products of the human mind to which Karl Popper also subscribed. In and of itself, it 
will go some way, but not the whole way, toward understanding the difficulties that Popper’s 
philosophy has created for methodologists in economics. 
My attempt to consider these issues will proceed in the following manner. In section (§) 2, I supply 
a selective chronicle of the discussions of Popper’s philosophy by methodologists in economics—one 
that is designed to highlight the problem that they would seem to have had in introducing his ideas 
to their fellow economists. In § 3, I offer some superficial reasons as to why Popper’s philosophy 
presents a problem to a would-be student of his works. In § 4, I explain how the nature of the 
problem may be more thoroughly understood. In §§ 5-6, I examine how it has created difficulties for 
those methodologists of economics who have attempted to interpret Popper’s philosophy and relate 
it to their own problem interests. The §§ 5-6 will go some way toward resolving the controversies 
that characterise the discussion of Popper’s ideas in the methodological literature of economics.  In 
§ 7, I ground what would otherwise be a somewhat abstract and airy discussion of the history of 
ideas by giving an illustration of why Popper’s philosophy continues to be important to 
contemporary economic theorisation and debate. In contrast to the impression that may be given by 
the title of Backhouse (2012), the illustration is designed to demonstrate why it might not yet be the 
‘calling time’ on Karl Popper’s philosophy. In § 8, I conclude the paper, mostly by emphasising that it 
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is only a job half-done because the difficulties presented by Popper’s UoM doctrine require a further 
discussion.  
2. The Chronicles of Popper 
Economic methodologists had a problem in introducing Karl Popper’s philosophy to their fellow 
economists. That this is so is signified by the titles of the many papers that have addressed the issue. 
One of the first economists to reference Popper’s (1934) Logik der Forschung1 was the late Terence 
Hutchison (1938); but the message that Hutchison took from Popper’s analysis of the logic of 
scientific discovery came to be criticised by Klappholz and Agassi (1959). That criticism carried 
weight because Joseph Agassi was at that time one of Popper’s closest collaborators. Yet Hutchison 
responded to the criticism, so ‘Methodological Prescriptions in Economics’ (Klappholz and Agassi, 
1959) begat ‘Methodological Prescriptions in Economics: A Reply’ (Hutchison, 1960). That exchange 
coincided with the translation of Logik der Forschung (L.d.F) into English as The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery (L.Sc.D; Popper, 2002A [1959/1934]). Popper’s analysis thereby became available to a 
much wider readership and L.Sc.D soon established itself as a stalwart reference in studies of the 
methodology of economics. It became, for instance, a crucial component to Mark Blaug’s widely-
read text on The Methodology of Economics (1980). But Blaug’s reading of Popper was not accepted 
by all and by 1985 the Popper-inspired literature on the methodology of economics was deemed to 
merit a wholesale re-appraisal. Thus, ‘Karl Popper and Economic Methodology - A New Look’ (Hands, 
1985). This was followed by a thirty-two page panoramic with the objective of ‘Clarifying Popper’ 
(Caldwell, 1991); but the clarity revealed that there was a problem in ‘Dealing with Popper in 
Economic Methodology’ (Boland, 2003). Yet one way to deal with a problem is to deny that it exists. 
So, in a revisionist style, an about turn to the 1930s has recently been made. Hart (2011, p. 414) 
argues that Klappholz and Agassi’s (1959) criticisms of Hutchison ‘… are misdirected because they 
assume that Hutchison is operating in some kind of Popperian world’; an assumption that Hart 
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disputes. An intellectual chronicle-cum-obituary also came to pass: ‘The Rise and Fall of Popper and 
Lakatos in Economics’ (Backhouse, 2012). 
Crudely summarised, the chronicles of Popper in the literature on the methodology of economics 
are a chronicle of disagreement. Why is this? 
3. The Enigma of Popper 
Sir Karl Raimund Popper [1902-1994] has become something of an enigma. He described himself as 
‘... a disciple of Socrates’ and in his writings he often emphasised the value and scarcity of a Socratic 
intellectual modesty (Popper, 1974, p. 962, 1994A). Indeed one of his leading students wrote that he 
‘... made a fetish of modesty’ (Munz, 2004, p. 22). In contrast, Steve Fuller (2003, p. 2) claims that ‘… 
over his lifetime Popper rarely received the recognition that he thought he deserved—and never 
tired of reminding everyone of it’. However these divergent personal impressions have arisen, 
intellectual modesty did not conceal Socrates under history’s bushel; Popper likewise. Thus whilst 
Popper might, or might not, cringe at being described as one of the greatest thinkers of the 
twentieth century, the case is easily made. Born in fin-de-siècle Vienna, the span of his intellectual 
life, which he often dated as beginning in 1919, embraced three-quarters of that century and the 
intellectually more vibrant part at that. During that time, the scope of his interests and 
achievements were unusually wide, and included revolutionary contributions to epistemology, the 
philosophy of science, probability theory, the philosophy of history, and political philosophy.2 And 
finally, if an immodest claim is made to supplement these observations, one might also say that 
Popper has an attribute that is shared by many great thinkers: he somehow influences the thought 
of the many who have never read him. 
But ideas that become a part of a society’s general back-ground knowledge, without actually being 
generally studied or taught, are ideas prone to distortion.  Consider the way in which some of 
Popper’s central motifs circulate in popular discourse. Take his idea and doctrine of ‘the Open 
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Society’ (Popper, 1966A [1945], 1966B [1945]). It presents an intellectual defence of freedom and a 
diagnosis of the intellectual origins and errors of utopian social planning and totalitarianism, but to-
day it is often equated with the idea of a liberal democracy with a market economy in which 
‘anything goes’: a catch-all absolver for all manner of intolerant opinion and behaviour. Yet a key 
part of Popper’s argument involved the realisation that the Open Society, if it is to protect the 
freedoms of its people, must establish an interventionist state that is prepared to defend the 
tolerant against the onslaught of the intolerant.3 Moreover, Popper acknowledged that state 
interventionism must extend to matters economic—a position that is easily overlooked given his 
reputation for being a cold-war liberal, member of the Mont Pèlerin society, and close associate of 
Friedrich von Hayek.4 Elsewhere, it is not unusual to find Popper’s critique of the ‘conspiracy theory 
of society’ (2002B [1963], p. 165 [emphasis in original]), or the thesis that social outcomes are the 
result of the design of some powerful individual or group, conveniently transmogrified by some, 
usually a powerful individual or group, into the claim that a conspiracy theory is incapable of 
explaining any event at all. 
For those who seek to develop a better understanding of Popper’s philosophy, any prior 
misconceptions about the meaning of those few Popper motifs that have entered popular discourse 
are not too difficult to dispel.  A more serious problem for the would-be student is that there are 
several episodes in Popper’s intellectual history that have entered intellectual folklore. They present 
a problem in so far as they are essentially spectacular side-shows; yet the watching of a side-show 
can create the misimpression of having witnessed the main event. Indeed, Popper sought to dispel 
what he described as the ‘Popper legend’ (Popper, 1974, p. 963). That legend surrounded his setting 
the Vienna Circle’s positivists aright on how to demarcate the theoretical systems of the empirical 
sciences from those of metaphysics. Contrary to the legend, Popper argued that this could be  
achieved without rendering metaphysics into meaningless nonsense or foundering on the problem 
of induction.5 Another instance of contested lore centres on Popper’s confrontation with Ludwig 
Wittgenstein—who may or may not have been gesticulating with a fireplace poker—at the meeting 
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of the University of Cambridge’s Moral Sciences Club in 1946 (Popper, 2002C [1974]).6 Yet another is 
his 1961 debate—or non-debate as the case might be—with Theodore Adorno on the logic of the 
social sciences (Adorno, et al 1976).7 Similarly, his 1965 debate—or non-debate as the case might 
be—with Thomas Kuhn over their differing views of science (Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970).8  
Although the aforementioned reports or misreports of these famous intellectual confrontations 
are want to both distract and breed misunderstandings as to what Popper’s philosophy was all 
about, they do supply a clue as to why that philosophy presents a problem to a would-be student of 
his work. The clue is that they are public illustrations of Popper’s every-day mode and attitude 
toward philosophising—a mode and attitude that was not always shared by his interlocutors. It is 
something that Popper himself called attention toward in the introduction to one of his final 
publications.  Popper (1994B) emphasised a single sentence that he had first written some fifty years 
earlier in The Open Society and Its Enemies (Popper, 1966B [1945]). He wrote that the sentence had 
been little noticed by others, yet, to him, summed up the approach to philosophy that he called 
‘critical rationalism’ (Popper, 1966B [1945], p. 229). The sentence was: ‘I may be wrong and you may 
be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth’ (Popper, 1994B, p. xii, 1966B [1945], p. 
225 [emphasis in originals]). 
This motto, which at first sight may seem rather trivial, actually summarises a great many 
significant ideas. It encapsulates Popper’s subscription to the principle of fallibilism—the recognition 
that the best of our knowledge may be mistaken. It encapsulates Popper’s commitment to a 
principle of tolerance and charity—that since we are all fallible we ought mutually to pardon each 
other’s stupidities and respect and genuinely entertain one another’s ideas. It encapsulates Popper’s 
commitment to the use of critical reason—the attitude that it is by arguing rationally over our 
practical and theoretical proposals that we may hope to discover their potency in addressing our 
practical and intellectual problems. It encapsulates Popper’s commitment to truth as a standard for 
our critical reason—that we may hope to improve our theoretical knowledge, not by searching for a 
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final positive and definitive justification of it, but by moving it nearer to the truth through the 
detection and elimination of error. And finally, it encapsulates the idea that there is an objective 
reality for critical reason to explore; for knowledge can only be fallible and mistaken if there is 
something external to the mind to be mistaken about. Taken together, these are the principal ideas 
of Popper’s philosophy of critical rationalism. 
But crucially, this mode of philosophising entails that a proper appreciation of many of Popper’s 
arguments and doctrines cannot be attained from simply studying the arguments and doctrines 
themselves. What it also requires is an appreciation of his interlocutors’ arguments and an 
appreciation of the problem that he and they were addressing. A recognition of this very difficulty 
features in Popper’s own discussion of the problem of understanding a scientific theory. In 1963, 
during a plenary address to a conference on experimental biology, he said: 
What is meant by saying that we ‘understand’ a scientific theory?... Understanding a theory, I suggest, means 
understanding it as an attempt to solve a certain problem. This is an important proposition, and one which too 
few people understand. What is the point of, say, Newton’s theory? It is an attempt to solve the problem of 
explaining Kepler’s and Galileo’s laws. Without understanding the problem situation that gave rise to the 
theory, the theory is pointless—that is, it cannot be understood. (Popper, 1994B, pp. 101-102 [emphasis in 
original]) 
Indeed, the problem is even here present: Popper’s thesis that science begins with problems is 
itself more readily understandable if one appreciates that it has an antithesis: that science begins 
with observation. It was this thesis that L.Sc.D, in part, opposed.9 
4. Popper and the ‘Logic of Question and Answer’ 
So the problem that is presented to a would-be student of Popper’s works now comes into clearer 
view. If Popper’s general approach to philosophising was to develop his ideas in relation to various 
problems, or problem situations that had other discussants, then any attempt to understand what 
he had to say on any matter, at any moment in time, is a historical conjecture as to the make-up of 
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his problem situation at that moment in time. Moreover, the message of the Popper canon of say, 
1959, might not be quite the same as that of, say, 1934—even when it ostensibly addresses the 
same problem. This for the simple reason that Popper’s own learning about the problem, and the 
state of the general critical discussion addressing it, might well have altered in the intervening time.  
Accordingly, as Popper (1979, pp. 177-178) himself proposed, the development of a historical 
understanding of a theory is ‘… free to use anything that may be helpful’ and may ‘… be elaborated 
or even radically changed whenever the need arises’; for instance, whenever criticism renders a 
particular construction unsatisfactory. Consequently, the exploration of a thinker’s historical 
problem situation need not entail the mode of historical explanation that Malachi Hacohen (2002 
[2000]) adopted in his impressive intellectual biography of Karl Popper’s formative years. That book 
placed Popper’s early intellectual development in the social, political and cultural context of interwar 
Vienna; but as its author acknowledged, directly placing a theory in the more immediate context of 
its problem situation is ‘… a crucial intellectual history method’ (2002 [2000], p. 19).10 Indeed, as the 
reception of Hacohen’s own study perhaps illustrates, opening the problem of historical 
understanding to the influence of ever more nebulous factors may produce far more controversial 
results.11 
Of course, all this is not to say that Popper may not bear some responsibility for the difficulties that 
might arise in interpreting his work. Although he was all too aware of the intellectual problem of 
understanding another thinker’s intellectual problems, the effort that he himself made, in his 
writing, to document his own intellectual problems, and who he shared them with, was variable. 
Generally, a reader must pay close attention to the copious footnotes to Popper’s works in order to 
find out who a particular argument might be directed towards. And as § 6 of this paper will make 
clear, it is also a challenge to detect when Popper’s own thinking about a particular problem might 
have changed course over time. 
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But a scholarly attention to detail may on occasion still prove to be an inadequate response to the 
problem of understanding another thinker’s problem situation. This is perhaps illustrated by 
Popper’s own discussion of the issue in the aforementioned conference address reproduced in 
Popper (1994B)—it so closely resembles the thoughts of his fellow philosopher, R.G. Collingwood 
[1889-1943], that it is hard to accept that Popper was not attuned to Collingwood’s works when he 
discussed the matter. For instance, Collingwood (1939, p. 55), writes: 
… according to my own ‘logic of question and answer’, a philosopher’s doctrines are his answers to certain 
questions he has asked himself, and no one who does not understand what the questions are can hope to 
understand the doctrines. 
Yet Popper did not elect to cite Collingwood in this address. Nonetheless, an important influence 
may be hypothesised, for elsewhere, in a paper dating from 1968, Popper compares extensively his 
own mode of historical explanation to that of Collingwood, whom he describes as ‘one of the great 
students of this problem’ (Popper, 1979, p. 183). Hence a reader of Popper (1994B) would have had 
to have either come to Popper via Collingwood, or would have had to have read this other part of 
the Popper canon, in order to recognise the possible intellectual influence of Collingwood’s ‘logic of 
question and answer’ on Popper’s own position. 
Generally, the importance of the ‘logic of question and answer’ to understanding the theoretical 
products of the human mind ought to be within the grasp of economists. Let us consider some 
examples from within the subject’s own intellectual history. Consider, for instance, Popper’s own 
major work on the philosophy of history and the methodology of the social sciences: The Poverty of 
Historicism (1957). The book, which was first published as a series of papers in Economica (Popper, 
1944A, 1944B, 1945), constructs a formidable doctrine on the methods of the social sciences: the 
doctrine that it labelled as ‘historicism’. It reveals why that doctrine has a pernicious influence upon 
a society and its politics, proceeds to criticise it, and then presents an alternative account of what 
the character and methods of the social sciences ought to be. Several decades removed from the 
historicist horrors of Nazism, Stalinism, and the Central European Tragedy, a historically blinkered 
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reader of to-day might well wonder why its author went to such a trouble. In a similar fashion, 
consider what a student of economics, living in Great Britain during the post-war years, would have 
made of J.A. Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943). Given the impact of 
socialism on the politics of the early twentieth century, such a reader would have understood 
Schumpeter’s problem situation. Contrast that reader with a counterpart in the second decade of 
the twenty-first century. Such a latter-day reader might well find the book’s concerns to be all rather 
quaint and peculiar. Or consider how The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money 
(Keynes, 1936) might come to be understood by two groups of readers of which only one has a grasp 
of the author’s problem: whether the postulates of classical economics are generally applicable to 
the money-using society and uncertain world in which he lived. Cue a discussion that contrasts 
Keynesian economics with the economics of Keynes.12 
But rather than consider these or any further examples, let us instead consider how these kinds of 
factors, and a failure to adopt Collingwood’s so-called ‘logic of question and answer’, have created 
difficulties for those methodologists of economics who have sought to interpret Popper’s 
philosophy. 
5.  Popper and the Methodologists of Economics 
To begin, anyone expecting to find in Popper’s writings some advice on how to resolve 
methodological problems in economic research is liable to map a solution to one problem as if it 
were an attempt to solve another. And unsurprisingly, the fidelity of their map is liable to be 
disputed by those more familiar with the original terrain.  
For instance, Popper is clear that the opening chapters of L.Sc.D—the 1959 English language 
translation of L.d.F. (1934)—address two ‘fundamental problems’, namely, ‘… the logical analysis of… 
the method of the empirical sciences’ and ‘… what do we call ‘empirical science’?’ (2002A 
[1959/1934], p. 3). These are the so-called problems of induction and demarcation respectively. The 
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problem of demarcation, which Popper attributed to Immanuel Kant, is how ‘… to distinguish the 
empirical sciences on the one hand, and mathematics and logic as well as ‘metaphysical’ systems on 
the other’ (Popper, 2002A [1959/1934], p. 11). The problem of induction, which Popper attributed to 
David Hume, is that the invalidity of inductive inference presents a problem to the principle of 
empiricism—the principle that only experience can decide upon the truth and falsity of a factual 
statement; for how can the strictly universal statements that characterise generalised theories be 
validly inferred from particular experiences?13 But as Popper’s discussion makes clear, Kant and 
Hume are stalking-horses for his real target and problem situation: the logical positivists of the 
Vienna Circle.14  
Famously, in his solution to the problem of demarcation, Popper proposed the criterion of 
‘falsifiability’. This presented the generalising empirical sciences as being comprised of systems of 
statements with a logical form that is amenable to being tested by experience, or rather by the 
statements that report experience. Why did he offer the criterion of ‘falsifiability’? One reason is 
that the logical form of strictly universal statements is that they ‘… are never derivable from singular 
statements, but can be contradicted by singular statements’ (Popper, 2002A [1959/1934], p. 19); 
that is, they are ‘falsifiable’. The proposed criterion of falsifiabilty therefore recasts the principle of 
empiricism: in Popper’s epistemology empirical knowledge is neither induced from, nor verified by, 
experience; but the reports of experience can test the logical implications of a system of empirical 
theories: ‘It might be described as the theory of the deductive method of testing, or as the view that 
a hypothesis can only be empirically tested—and only after it has been advanced’ (Popper 2002A 
[1959/1934], p. 7 [emphasis in original]). To Popper, this solved (or perhaps dissolved) the problem 
of induction. 
Enter an economic methodologist with a different problem. With the tradition of a priori economic 
theorisation in his intellectual gun sight, the late Terence Hutchison (1938) invoked Popper’s 
falsifiability criterion to classify economic theory into either the empirically falsifiable or the 
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analytic/tautologous. But that is not to use the criterion as Popper intended—to demarcate the 
systems of statements that comprise the empirical sciences from those statements that are either 
analytic/tautologous or metaphysical. Two of Popper’s colleagues at the London School of 
Economics (LSE) eventually came to consider the discrepancy between the intended and the new 
application (Klappholz and Agassi, 1959). By way of illustration, they used the following two 
statements: ‘ceteris paribus, the imposition of a tax on cigarettes will raise their price’ and ‘ceteris 
paribus, the imposition of a tax on cigarettes will not raise their price’. Each statement refers to the 
seemingly empirically familiar, but neither is falsifiable so long as the specific reference of the ceteris 
paribus clause is undisclosed; yet clearly neither statement is necessarily true or tautologous—each 
statement is incompatible with the other. In short, pace Hutchison, metaphysical statements do not 
reduce or equate to analytical statements or tautologies. 
To say all of this slightly differently: Popper’s problem was to formulate a criterion as to what 
ought to qualify as an empirical statement so far as an empirical science is concerned. And this is an 
important problem for an empirical science even if there are no prospects of its practitioners ever 
uttering a tautology. For there are seemingly empirical statements, even seemingly empirically 
confirmable statements, that are not empirically falsifiable statements. Consider a statement like: 
‘there exists a fertilizer that will increase the volume of a tobacco crop ten-fold‘. How can the truth 
or falsity of this statement be investigated empirically when all empirical observation and 
investigation, precisely because it is empirical observation and investigation, is space and time 
bound? Scientific investigations require hypotheses that make a difference, either directly or 
indirectly, to what is observable; if they do not then they should not be admitted to empirical 
science.15 
Enter another economic methodologist with a different set of problems. The late Mark Blaug 
(1980) posed two questions: where do economic theories fall when classified against the falsifiability 
criterion and how widely do economists practise the deductive method of testing their theories? But 
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an exploration of those problems may produce disagreement if Imre Lakatos’s (1970) thought on the 
thought of Karl Popper is presented as if it were Karl Popper’s thought on the thought of Karl 
Popper. And this was the charge that Lawrence Boland (1994, 2003, 2006) levelled against Blaug’s 
project. Boland (1994, p. 154) proposed that ‘two views of Popper’ circulate amongst economic 
methodologists. The ‘popular view’, which Boland attributed to Blaug, is labelled ‘falsificationism’.16 
‘Falsificationism’ emphasises the problem of demarcation—albeit as formulated by Imre Lakatos 
(1970). The other view, which is Boland’s own, is that of ‘the Socratic Popper’ (Boland, 1994, p. 157). 
The ‘Socratic Popper’ places the criterion of falsifiability into the broader context of the fallibilist 
philosophy of critical rationalism. Boland (1994) argued that the two differing views of Popper 
mirrored the intellectual differences that arose between Imre Lakatos and the other members of 
Popper’s seminar group at the LSE in the late 1950s and early 1960s; namely, Lakatos’s differences 
with Joseph Agassi and William Warren Bartley III. Caldwell (1991, p. 25) drew a similar distinction 
between ‘Popper the falsificationist’ and ‘Popper the critical rationalist’. More recently, Hart (2011) 
offers not one, but two caveats as to which Karl Popper he is writing about by entitling his own 
rendition of Popper’s philosophy of science—replete with references to Popper’s L.Sc.D (1959)—as 
‘(the Lakatosian) falsificationist interpretation of Popper’s philosophy of science’ (Hart 2011, p. 411). 
 But these various Karl Popper avatars are the creation of the methodologists of economics and 
they surely do two things: firstly, they further the image of Karl Popper as enigma; secondly, they 
make the discussion of Popper’s philosophy in economics highly problematical and perhaps even 
faintly ridiculous. 
Can the problem of ‘the two Karl Poppers’ be more thoroughly resolved by ‘the logic of question 
and answer’? In particular, can it be resolved by a conjecture that even a great thinker like Popper 
found reason to change the emphasis of his thought over time? And the reason was that his problem 
situation, and his reaction to it, developed over time. Unfortunately, Clarifying Popper, Bruce 
Caldwell’s (1991) otherwise panoramic review of Popper’s philosophy and a key source for 
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subsequent discussions of Popper’s philosophy by economic methodologists, shunned this crucial 
issue: 
Sorting out “what Popper thought when” is a daunting job… There will be no attempt to provide a 
chronological depiction of the development of Popper’s thought… this paper focuses rather narrowly on 
Popper’s methodology of science (Caldwell, 2001, p. 2). 
But the job of sorting out ‘what Popper thought when’ is not quite as daunting as Caldwell 
supposed. More importantly, according to the ‘logic of question and answer’, it is the obvious means 
by which the ‘two Karl Poppers’ can be unified. 
6. Unifying the ‘Two Karl Poppers’ 
Earlier, in § 5, it was noted that the real problem situation of L.d.F. (1934) was the Vienna Circle and 
its doctrines concerning the theory of knowledge and meaning.17 The doctrines proposed that only 
two forms of proposition were meaningful or cognitively significant: firstly, analytic propositions 
whose necessary truth can be demonstrated by formal proof; secondly, empirical propositions 
whose truth or falsity can be decided by experience. For the Circle, meaningful science was thereby 
demarcated from meaningless metaphysics by a criterion of verification: a scientific proposition was 
one that could be verified by an actual or possible experience. 
Popper was unconcerned with the Circle’s treatment of analytical statements, but, as noted in § 5, 
he had a different solution to the problem of how to demarcate science from metaphysics. However, 
he also differed from the Circle in his conceptualisation of the underlying problem. In particular, he 
was not at all concerned with the problem of what is meaningful—to him metaphysical theories 
were not meaningless, they were just not scientific when assessed against the logical criterion of 
falsifiability. On the other hand, Popper clearly admired the Circle’s bold attempt to wrestle with 
major philosophical problems—problems that were central to the interests of great philosophers like 
Immanuel Kant. For instance, Popper (2002A [1959/1934], p. 11) wrote that the problem of 
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demarcation became, with Kant, ‘… the central problem of the theory of knowledge’ and that it was 
‘… the source of nearly all the other problems of the theory of knowledge’. He wrote that ‘… it is the 
task of the logic of scientific discovery, or the logic of knowledge… to analyse the method of the 
empirical sciences’ (Popper, 2002A [1959/1934], p. 3). 
These passages in L.d.F/L.Sc.D. seemingly suggest that Popper was, at least in part, following the 
agenda of the Circle: all serious argument and inquiry, aside from that which fell within the curtilage 
of logic and mathematics, must deploy the logic of scientific discovery. For instance, in the citation 
that concludes the paragraph above, ‘the logic of knowledge’ is equated with ‘the logic of scientific 
discovery’. Elsewhere, Popper wrote ‘… epistemology, or the logic of scientific discovery, should be 
identified with the theory of scientific method’ (Popper, 2002A [1959/1934], p. 27). And he wrote 
that: ‘As to the task of the logic of knowledge… I shall proceed on the assumption that it consists 
solely in investigating the methods employed in those systematic tests to which every new idea must 
be subjected if it is to be seriously entertained’ (Popper, 2002A [1959/1934], p. 8). Hence, these 
passages do seem to suggest that outside of the formal disciplines, the limits of what is arguable 
coincide with the limits of empirical science. On this reading, Popper’s position might be summarised 
as something like: ‘arguability as science as testing’. 
But on the other hand, there are also passages in L.d.F/L.Sc.D. that suggest that this reading is 
misleading. In particular, Popper’s thinking about the problem of demarcation unearthed a new 
problem. It first surfaces when Popper (2002A [1959/1934] § 4) considers the epistemological status 
of the demarcation criteria itself. In his discussion of this issue, Popper rejects a naturalistic theory of 
methodology, or the view that methodology is itself an empirical science that must study actual 
scientific practice. On the contrary, Popper defended the autonomy of both methodology and 
philosophy. He wrote that he regarded his demarcation criteria as: 
… a proposal for an agreement or convention. As to the suitability of any such convention opinions may differ; 
and a reasonable discussion of these questions is only possible between parties having some purpose in 
common… There is only one way, as far as I can see, of arguing rationally in support of my proposals. This is to 
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analyse their logical consequences: to point out their fertility—their power to elucidate the problems of the 
theory of knowledge (Popper, 2002A [1959/1934], p. 15 [emphasis in original]) 
Thus, even in 1934, the problem of demarcation would seem to have produced a new 
subterranean problem: a problem of arguability. That is, whether the limits of what is rationally 
arguable coincide with the limits of empirical science.18 Furthermore, the passage would seem to 
suggest that Popper thought that they did not. As it noted, it is possible, if parties have a common 
purpose, to argue over the fruitfulness and usefulness of proposals.19 In this case, over the proposal 
to characterise empirical science by its method—principally, by the deductive method of testing.20 
Moreover, another passage suggests the autonomy of philosophical and methodological argument 
because Popper writes:  ‘… the main problem of philosophy is the critical analysis of the appeal to 
the authority of ‘experience’’ (2002A, [1959/1934], p. 30 [emphasis added]). 
Between 1934 and 1959, Popper further developed his thinking about this problem. One exhibit 
that is relevant to this conjecture is an amendment that was made, via a new footnote, to the 1959 
English language translation of L.d.F. In the opening chapters of the book, Popper’s main theses 
concerning the problems of demarcation and induction are presented and he summarised their 
implication for epistemology thus: 
I readily admit that only observation can give us ‘knowledge concerning facts’. But… this knowledge of ours 
does not justify or establish the truth of any statement. I do not believe… that the question which 
epistemology must ask is, ‘on what does our knowledge rest... or more exactly, how can I, having had the 
experience S. justify my description of it, and defend it against doubt?’… In my view, what epistemology has to 
ask is, rather: how do we test scientific statements by their deductive consequences. (Popper, 2002A 
[1959/1934], pp. 79-80) 
This passage is from the main text of L.Sc.D., the 1959 English language translation of L.d.F. (1934). 
However, in the 1959 translation, Popper added a new footnote to the passage above, rephrasing it 
as follows: 
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At present, I should formulate this question thus. How can we best criticize our theories… rather than defend 
them against doubt? Of course testing was always, in my view, part of criticizing. (Popper, 2002A [1959], p. 80 
fn.*1 [emphasis in original]). 
Now the significance of this amendment would seem to depend upon what problem it is related to. 
If a reader relates it to the problem of demarcation, which is what Popper is ostensibly addressing, 
then admittedly the reformulation seems insignificant: in deducing some consequences from a 
theory so that they may be compared against the reports of experience one is in search of a reason 
to criticise the theory. This is how the deductive method can probe (but not justify) theories and 
‘knowledge concerning facts’. Hence criticism, in this case the discovery of a logical contradiction, 
may open our minds to the inadequacy of our empirical theories, possibly thereby stimulating new 
conjectures. So in 1934, Popper’s position may be read as something like: “arguability as science as 
testing”; and in 1959, given the aforementioned new footnote, it may be read as something like 
“arguability as science as criticism as testing”. This hardly seems a significant alteration. Indeed, if 
the deductive method is to have any logical force, critically appraising whether the implications of an 
empirical theory have been validly inferred from it being conjoined to other auxiliary premises is a 
necessary preliminary to empirical testing. 
But in subsequent publications, Popper signalled that the amendment held a greater significance. 
Importantly, in the first volume to his Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery (1983, § 17)21 
Popper explicitly acknowledged that the problem of demarcation had other problems closely linked 
to it; namely, what he there expressly called ‘the problem of arguability’ (Popper, 1983, p. 161). In 
response to this latter problem, Popper eliminates any ambiguity as to how the aforementioned 
passages of L.Sc.D ought to be interpreted. For instance, in the preface to the book, Popper declares 
that what matters to science is ‘… a man who wishes to understand the world and to learn by 
arguing with others’; and that ‘… the so-called method of science consists in this kind of criticism’ 
(Popper, 1983, pp. 6-7 [emphasis in original]). This shift might be summarised as a move from 
something like “arguability as science”, in which the limits of what is rationally arguable coincide 
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with the limits of science, to something like “science as arguability”, in which they do not. So the 
aforementioned formulation becomes something like: “science as arguability as criticism as testing”; 
where criticism is now generally regarded as the logical means to probe and test the implications of 
a theory. This shift in emphasis is evident in many of Popper’s post-L.Sc.D publications. For instance, 
in his 1961 exchange with Theodore Adorno, Popper laid out his views on the Logic of the Social 
Sciences in a series of crisply-formulated theses; a kind of Maginot Line that he wanted Adorno to 
attack (Adorno, et al 1976).22 In the twelfth thesis he wrote: ‘What may be described as scientific 
objectivity is based solely upon that critical tradition which… makes it possible to criticize a dominant 
dogma’. And in the fourteenth thesis: ‘I consider it important to identify scientific method, at least in 
the first approximation, with the critical method’. Still later, in a paper entitled Science and Criticism 
and dating from 1974, Popper wrote: 
The criterion of scientific status which I have proposed for theories… is criticizability, rational criticism. In the 
natural sciences this boils down to criticizability by means of empirical tests or empirical refutations (Popper, 
1994A, p. 54). 
Finally, in a paper dating from 1970, Popper seems to explicitly acknowledge that he had further 
developed his thinking since the time of L.d.F.: 
In those days I wrongly identified the limits of science with those of arguability. I later changed my mind and 
argued that non-testable (i.e. irrefutable) metaphysical theories may be rationally arguable. (Popper, 1979, p. 
40 fn. 9) 
Why does this represent a development in Popper’s thinking? It is because the latter position 
offers a generalised epistemology: a generalisation of L.d.F/L.Sc.D’s ‘theory of the deductive method 
of testing’ into the wholesale philosophy that Popper subsequently called ‘critical rationalism’ 
(1966B [1945], p. 232). How do the positions differ? Critical rationalism may equate (rather than 
demarcate) different cognitive activities so long as they each embody a ‘critical method’—at least in 
‘the first approximation’. Yet it also allows for differences as to what those activities might ‘boil 
down to’. Thus said, critical rationalism does not make the demarcation criterion of falsifiability 
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redundant, for pointing out that a theory, as presently formulated, is incapable of being logically 
contradicted by the reports of experience may itself be a valuable form of criticism. It might, for 
instance, prompt the reformulation of the theory so that it does become more criticisable by 
becoming amenable to empirical testing. And, as Popper says, in the empirical sciences such 
empirical testability is what criticism ‘boils down to’. Hence the criterion of falsifiability can be 
retained as a solution to the problem of demarcating the empirical sciences from metaphysics, but 
crucially it no longer ought to be read as demarcating what is arguable per se. If a metaphysical 
theory can be criticised then it is also arguable. Indeed, one should note in considering these issues, 
that in 1958, just one year prior to the new footnote being inserted into the English translation of 
L.d.F., Popper wrote a detailed paper that discussed how metaphysics is criticisable.23 
Thus, the origin of the various Popper avatars in the literature on the methodology of economics is 
revealed: Popper’s thought changed tack between 1934 and 1959. Indeed, his later position was 
pretty much summed up by Klappholz and Agassi all those years ago: ‘Our view… is that there is only 
one generally applicable methodological rule, and that is the exhortation to be critical’ (1959, p. 60 
[emphasis added]). So, two cheers for Lawrence Boland, Karl Popper is indeed best understood as a 
disciple of Socrates and falsifiability is not the be-all and end-all of Popper’s philosophy. 
7.  The Legacy of Popper 
The fallibilist philosophy of critical rationalism rejects the idea that truth is manifest and that there is 
an infallible method for discovering it. In the aftermath of a great economic catastrophe, the 
continued relevance of this idea should hardly require much emphasis. I am referring, of course, to 
the British banking crisis of the first decade of the twentieth-first century. Nonetheless, given that 
the title of Backhouse (2012) may lead some to surmise otherwise, that event might usefully further 
illustrate why the philosophy of critical rationalism continues to be important to contemporary 
economic theorisation and debate. 
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Consider the theory that a panel of experts from the British Academy offered to Her Britannic 
Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, in response to her question, posed during a visit to the LSE, as to why no 
one had foreseen the so-called ‘credit crunch’. In a letter to Her Majesty, two Fellows of the 
Academy summarised the factors that had been identified by the panel as contributing to the failure 
of banks, regulators, commentators and politicians to foresee the crunch: ‘wishful thinking’, ‘hubris’, 
‘delusion’, ‘the psychology of herding’, ‘a psychology of denial’ and an overall ‘failure in the 
collective imagination of many bright people’ (Besley and Hennessy, 2009). Let us call this sketched 
theory T1. T1 is psychologistic: it reduces the explanation of an historical event to the individual 
psychologies of some of the agents directly involved in it. T1 does not explicitly contain a strictly 
universal statement and those that it may implicitly contain seem rather trivial or infertile. As Popper 
(1957, § 32) noted, it is hard to conceive of any historical event which could not be plausibly 
explained by an appeal to certain propensities of ‘human nature’. Thus, aside from the agents 
involved testifying that they think the account offered by T1 is true or false of them—a testimony 
that they might be rather unwilling to supply—it is hard to see how the deductive method of 
empirical testing is relevant to the assessment of T1. 
But is T1 within or beyond the reach of critical rationalism? How might its claims be criticised and 
rendered rationally arguable? A critic of T1 might say that the pre-crash business strategies of some 
of the banks were inconsistent with the background knowledge represented by the basic principles 
of prudent banking. Further, that the persons involved in banking, be they intellectually bright or 
otherwise, did not need to ‘imagine’ those principles—they only needed to study them. But then the 
leaders of some of the crashed British banks held no qualifications in banking. Consequently, the 
critic might question the adequacy of the regulatory framework for appointing such persons. The 
critic’s remarks therefore examine institutional conditions that are ignored by T1. Our critic might 
also cite J.M. Keynes’s (1936) remark that money is, above all else, a device for linking the present to 
the future; so money in a monetary society must endure if that society is to also endure. Thus 
systemically inter-connected banks may enjoy an implicit societal guarantee that their business will 
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endure.  What if the critic sketches an alternative theory, T2, that clashes in important respects with 
T1? What if T2 is less charitable in its assessment of the aims and motivations of some bankers and 
emphasises the conflicts of interest that can exist within a bank? What if T2 argues that, given the 
institutional conditions which are ignored by T1, it is all too rational to pursue power and personal 
wealth in the banking industry without having to worry too much about the costs of institutional 
failure? What if T2 presents these factors as having played an important role in bringing about the 
insolvency of some banks?24 
Is it possible to critically explore the strengths and weaknesses of T1 and T2? Would it assist if, 
under the weight of the account supplied by T2, the political institutions of an open society were to 
establish a Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards with terms of reference to investigate 
‘...the professional standards and culture of the UK banking sector’ and ‘... the lessons to be learned 
about corporate governance, transparency and conflicts of interest, and their implications for 
regulation and for Government policy’?25 
What I am suggesting is that to call ‘time’ on the philosophy of critical rationalism is really to call 
‘time’ on the idea of the Open Society itself. And what I am also suggesting is that the corollaries of 
critical rationalism must be properly understood if they are not to be lost through neglect or 
complacency. This is important because the stakes are higher than some methodologists of 
economics seem able to appreciate. This is perhaps understandable given their neglect of the logic 
of ‘question and answer’, but it was with a surprising degree of complacency that Mark Blaug (1994) 
asserted that if criticism was all that his preferred methodology of ‘falsificationism’ amounted to 
then that was not very much. In fact he sarcastically declared that ‘…in the end we can say with 
perfect confidence that ‘we are all falsificationists now’ (Blaug, 1994, p. 114). But critical rationalists 
do not place their unqualified confidence in anything, let alone in the tolerance by others of the 
critical attitude itself. One does not need to be a philosopher to appreciate that the struggle to 
escape from the tutelage of authority and prejudice is an almost perpetual theme of human history. 
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It was, after all, the struggle that led to the trial of Socrates. Indeed, even in philosophy itself, I 
suspect that the real situation is better reflected by Leonard Nelson’s (1949) remark:  
A stepchild of philosophy, slighted and rejected, the Socratic method has survived only in name beside its 
more popular older sister, the more insinuating and more easily manipulated dogmatic method. 
8. Conclusion 
The pertinence of Karl Popper’s philosophy to the methodology of economics has been much 
discussed and debated within the literature on the subject. In part those debates give testament to 
the methodological significance of the philosophical problems that Popper elected to address; but 
they are also a testament to the defective way in which methodologists have attended to the 
historical element in Popper’s oeuvre.  This historical element is especially significant to 
understanding a philosopher like Popper because his general approach to the problems that were of 
interest to him was to view them as fairly ‘open’: old problems could be revisited; old solutions could 
be improved; new solutions begat new problems. Overall, Popper’s philosophy was imbued with the 
view that a real philosopher has philosophical problems, so to understand Popper’s philosophy try 
and first understand the problem situation that his philosophy is addressing. Next, try and 
appreciate how the problem situation and his thinking about it might develop over time. This mode 
of philosophising has created difficulties for those economic methodologists who have attempted to 
interpret Popper’s philosophy whilst paying insufficient regard to these considerations.  This paper 
has attempted to address this deficit and thereby resolve some of the aforementioned debates. 
Yet in many respects this paper is a job that is only half-done: it merely clears a path toward 
achieving a better understanding of the problems that do arise for the methodology of economics 
when it is viewed by the lights of Karl Popper’s philosophy. Basically, it has arrived at the point at 
which others have began; namely ‘… with what Popper… has actually written about economics and 
other social sciences’ (Hands, 1985, p. 84). Except that we now know that it pays to be attentive to 
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the problem situation that Popper was addressing at any moment in time, that his thoughts about a 
problem might develop over time, and that both of these factors may have a bearing on how the 
content of his philosophy is to be understood at any moment in time. Praemonitus praemunitus.26 
Notes 
1 Translated into English as Popper 1959 The Logic of Scientific Discovery. 
2 For a review, see chapter 1 of Miller (2006). 
3 See chapter 7 fn.4 of Popper (1966A [1945]). 
4 See chapter 17 fn. 22 of Popper (1966B [1945]). For a discussion of Popper’s defence of state 
interventionism see Notturno (2006) and Kerstenetzky (2007). For details of Popper’s membership 
and involvement with the Mont Pèlerin society see Cockett (1994).  
5 See The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002A [1959/1934], §§ 1-6). In contrast to the Vienna Circle, 
and contrary to the so-called ‘Popper legend’, Popper did not assume that the problem of 
demarcating science from metaphysics was to be solved by the formulation of a so-called ‘criterion 
of meaning’ that demarcated sense from nonsense. For a discussion, see Popper (1974, p. 964). See 
also § 6 below. 
6 Popper delivered a paper entitled ‘Are there philosophical problems?’, but those present have 
differing recollections as to what was said, by whom, and whether or not a poker played an 
important role in the proceedings. See, for instance, Edmonds and Eidinow (2001), Munz (2004), 
Smiley (2004). 
7 There was little disagreement between Popper and Adorno during their actual exchange of ideas at 
the 1961 congress of the German Sociological Association; but the tone changed when Adorno later 
augmented his contribution with a supplementary paper. Popper and Adorno’s respective German 
disciples, Hans Albert and Jurgen Habermas, then exchanged commentaries thereby creating the so-
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called ‘Positivist Dispute in German Sociology’. See chapter 6 of Popper (1994A) for his scathing 
subsequent commentary on the whole affair. See, also, chapters 13 and 14 of Fuller (2003) for a 
discussion of the background to the exchange. 
8 Popper did not directly debate Thomas Kuhn. He occupied the Chair to an exchange involving Kuhn 
and several others. See Fuller (2003) for an account. 
9 See, for example, §25 and appendix *x of Popper (2002A [1959/1934]). 
10 Hacohen considers his own method as ‘extending’ what he calls the ‘internal’ theoretical problem 
situation so that it also considers ‘external’ political, social and cultural factors (2002 [2000], p. 20). 
He proposes (2002 [2000], p. 21) that this provides ‘… a fuller and more accurate account’, but that 
he does not regard the two methods as ‘challenging’ one another (2002 [2000], p. 20) 
11 Hacohen’s reconstruction of Popper’s early intellectual history, for all its fascinating background 
detail on the milieu of Interwar Vienna, is controversial. See, for instance, the criticisms offered by 
Popper’s some-time editors Troels Eggers Hansen (Hacohen, 2002 [2000], p. 198 fn. 82) and Mark A. 
Notturno (2002). 
12 An allusion to the title of Leijonhufvud (1968). Cp. Paul Davidson’s (2009, p. 38) observation that 
‘…“Keynesian” economics… has no connection with Keynes’s revolutionary analysis’.  
13 For instance, in empirical research, how can statements that report individual situations be used 
to make valid inferences about situations yet to be observed, or to all the possible situations that 
might be observed? 
14 See, for example, appendix *1 of Popper (2002A [1959/1934]).This reproduces Popper’s 1933 
letter to the editor of Erkenntnis—a journal associated with the members of the Vienna Circle. The 
letter critically contrasts Popper’s proposed solutions to the problems of induction and demarcation 
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with the views of the leading members of the Circle. For an account of Popper’s relationship to the 
Vienna Circle that is supplied by one of the Circle’s members, see Kraft (1974). See also § 6 below. 
15 For a detailed discussion see J.W.N Watkins (1957). I thank David Miller for drawing my attention 
to this article. For a highly accessible illustration see chapter 21 of Nicholas Fearn (2001); for 
applications to economic theorisation see J. Agassi (1971).  
16 Popper (1983, p. xxxi) claimed that he never used the label ‘falsificationism’ to describe his 
position. This is because of its tendency to confuse the falsifiability of a statement (which is a logical 
property) with its empirical falsification (which is an empirical matter requiring a decision to accept 
that a statement is false). The conflation of falsifiability with falsification eases the argument that 
Popper overlooked the problem that a statement can never be falsified conclusively. That is, the 
argument that he was a ‘naïve falsificationist’. Popper (1983, Introduction) attributes the argument 
that he was a ‘naïve falsificationist’ to Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos.  
17 See also fn. 5 and fn. 14 above. 
18 Cf. the title of the seminar paper that caused Popper’s legendary exchange with Wittgenstein: ‘Are 
there philosophical problems?’ in fn.6 above. 
19 See also Popper (1966A [1945A]) chapter 5 fn.5. I thank David Miller for drawing my attention to 
this footnote. 
20 Popper supplemented this principal proposal with many other proposed methodological rules. 
See, for example, Popper (2002A [1959/1934]) §11, §12, §20, §30. See Miller (2007 [1998]) for a 
discussion of Logik der Forschung as a treatise of methodological proposals whose application 
requires active decision making. 
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21 Although written in the period 1951-56, at the time that Logik der Forschung was being translated 
into English, the publication of The Postscript was much delayed. See the editor’s foreword to 
Popper (1983). The book’s preface dates from 1956. 
22 Reprinted as chapter 5 of Popper (1994A). 
23 Reprinted as chapter 8 of Popper (2002B [1963]). 
24 For further development of this criticism see Thomas (2012) and also the subsequent dialogue 
between Notturno and Thomas (2013). 
25 In July 2012, the three main British political parties cooperated to establish a Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards. See: 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/professional-
standards-in-the-banking-industry/news/call-for-evidence/ (accessed: 12 September 2012) 
26 Forewarned is forearmed. 
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